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National Security Council Intelligence Committee
WORKING GROUP

DCI/IC 73-0365

Minutes of the Eighth Meeting

1430 Hours, 9 May 1973

DCI Conference Room, CIA Headquarters

25X1A9 Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, DCI/IC Staff, Chairman presiding. Members present were: Mr. Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff; Mr. Seymour Weiss and Mr. George Denny (representing Dr. Cline), Department of State; Dr. Albert Hall, ASD(I), Maj. Gen. H. P. Smith, DIA (representing Vice Adm. de Poix), Rear Adm. S. D. Cramer, Jr., J-5 (representing Lt. Gen. Seith); Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI, Mr. John Huizenga, D/NE, [REDACTED] A/DDS&T, CIA; the Department of Justice was not represented. Others present were: Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, Executive Secretary; Capt. George Pickett, NSC Staff; Mr. Richard Curl, State Department; Mr. Patrick J. Parker, Defense Department and Capt. Gerald W. Dyer, J-5, JCS.

Agenda Item 1: Minutes of the 4 April meeting

25X1A9 The minutes were approved after acceptance of two changes, proposed by [REDACTED] prior to the meeting, for Agenda Items 4 and 7, and of a change proposed by Mr. Marshall for Agenda Item 3. (Copies of pages 2 and 3 of the Minutes of the Seventh Meeting, as amended, are being distributed.)

Mr. Marshall noted that although the minutes reported that completion of the Yugoslavia study was expected by June, the first draft was not yet completed and he did not believe the June deadline would be met.

Mr. Huizenga indicated even a rough draft would be helpful to the Office of National Estimates, which has been charged by the DCI with preparing a new estimate on Yugoslavia. After some discussion, the chairman asked Mr. Marshall to see what might be done toward speeding completion of the Working Group study.

Agenda Item 2: Case studies of political/military crisis situations

The memorandum for the NSCIC, drafted by a task group headed by Mr. Marshall, was approved for forwarding after acceptance of several editorial changes proposed by Dr. Proctor and a discussion which focused on two points.

The first had to do with the sentence in paragraph 18: "To prepare this product the DCI could constitute a task force or request other agencies to provide inputs to his CIA staff." Dr. Proctor proposed deletion of everything after the word "or", but several members commented on the need for allowing the DCI flexibility in electing how to proceed. The group felt the original wording should stand.

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The second arose when Dr. Hall questioned the management approach involved in having one DCI representative to handle liaison with the NSC Staff and another to insure the process of providing necessary intelligence support worked well. He felt one man should have the basic responsibility and the other should work for him.

After considerable discussion as to how the pace and intensity of the crisis could affect the functions being described, the group agreed that Mr. Marshall, with Dr. Hall's coordination, would amend the paper to clarify the hierarchical relationship of the two DCI representatives. (This was done on 10 May.)

Agenda Item 3: Involvement of the Working Group in the NIE process

At the opening of the meeting, the chairman announced this item would not be discussed since the DCI wished to consider the matter further before it is addressed by the Working Group. The chairman asked that members give thought to the matter since it would be on the agenda of a later meeting.

Agenda Item 4: Questions to be answered on Soviet ICBMs

Most of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of problems involved in conducting surveys which seek to measure the utility of intelligence production, and to a critique of a draft PRG/IC paper which evaluates finished intelligence products published in 1972 on Soviet ICBMs.

Responding to the initial question posed by Mr. Weiss as to the end objective of the ICBM survey, the chairman emphasized that a basic element of the exercise was to identify those products which were most useful and those least useful to the needs of intelligence consumers.

Criticisms of the draft PRG/IC paper included:

a. Lack of an assessment of product quality, and a means of determining how quality is to be measured.

b. Absence of a recognition that "redundancy" ratings need to be qualified by recognition that the same subject may have to be presented at different classification levels for different audiences.

c. Ratings on "policy and strategy" coverage on publications which several members did not consider to relate to this topic.

d. Lack of any recognition of the purpose which each publication was intended to serve.

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The chairman pointed out that "redundant" ratings appeared more frequently with respect to "weaponry" than on any other topic, and the greatest number of deficiencies were noted in the "policy and strategy" coverage.

Considerable discussion focused on examination of the need for publication as a means of lateral communication among intelligence analysts as well as for communication with consumers of intelligence.

It was generally agreed that:

- a. While the ICBM problem is complex, with a variety of different audiences for different products, and obtaining useful consumer reactions will be extremely difficult, the attempt should be made;
- b. Recommendations to improve the production process are needed, including guidelines as to which particular products should or should not be published;
- c. Particular attention should be given to assessment of the extent to which redundancy in products is needed;
- d. Criteria should be developed for measurement of the quality of intelligence products;
- e. The number of consumers of a particular product is not as important as how well the product serves key users;
- f. Intelligence producers need to be made aware of what other producers in the same subject-matter field are planning to publish.


Mr. Marshall and Dr. Hall also thought it would be well to take a "fine cut" at some segment of the production on Soviet ICBMs, examining in detail such matters as product quality and related costs.

Agenda Item 5: Future work program of the Working Group

The chairman asked if any member had proposals to submit concerning the possible future program of the group. There were no comments.

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The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours, with no date being set for the next meeting.



Daniel O. Graham
Major General, USA
Chairman, NSCIC Working Group